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CONFERENCE ON ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY
PANEL TWO: RULES 33 AND 34: DEFINING E-
DOCUMENTS AND THE FORM OF
PRODUCTION
MODERATOR
Hon. Shira Ann Scheindlin*
PANELISTS
David R. Buchanan**
Adam I. Cohen***
Hon. James C. Francis IVXt
Paul M. Robertsont
JUDGE SCHEINDLIN: The topic to briefly discuss is the
definition of e-data, and we are going to do that very briefly; that's a
three-minute segment of this show.
We will then turn to the question of whether Rule 34 needs revision
in order to refer to "data" or "information" rather than "documents,"1
which as you just heard may be a pass6 concept in the 21st century.
Listening to the last panel, I must say that relational databases and
formulas for spreadsheets do not entirely sound like "documents."
Questions that we will cover in that segment will include such things
as: In producing data stored on electronic media, should that
production include all data stored or maintained as part of the
electronic record? Just to whet your appetite.
Our next topic, our third of four, will be the form of production
question. The question there is: Should Rule 34 require the
requesting party to specify a particular form for producing the
* United States District Court Judge, Southern District of New York.
** Partner, Seeger Weiss LLP.
*** Partner, Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP.
t United States Magistrate Judge, Southern District of New York.
T Partner, Bingham McCutchen LLP.
1. Fed. R. Civ. P. 34.
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requested data; and should the Rule also talk about the grounds on
which a producing party might object, such as inaccessibility?
Finally, we will briefly turn to whether Rule 332 needs to be
amended to specify that interrogatories may be answered by the
production of electronic data; and, if so, what responsibility might the
producing party have to produce that data in some way that is actually
usable?
Now, on each topic we have decided to go in this order: our author,
Adam, will go first and try to give us the very briefest of backgrounds;
David and Paul, who are set up a little bit to be sparring partners, a
little bit of plaintiff/defense viewpoints, will then go next; and, as is
always appropriate, the judge will get the last word on every topic,
and of course that is Judge Francis, not your uncharacteristically quiet
moderator.
MR. ROBERTSON: I guess a couple of thoughts just before I start
this. The dichotomy that has been set up is between defendants' and
plaintiffs' bar. As David and I talked in preparation, we found that on
a lot of stuff there is some agreement here on the result that should be
reached. We really wanted to make sure that we kept both questions
in front of us at all times.
The first one was: Is there a problem; is there something that needs
to be fixed? Only then did we get to the second one: Okay, if there is
a problem, what is the proposed rule change? In all instances, even if
I thought that there wasn't necessarily a problem, I thought it was
important to at least propose a suggested fix, some suggested
language. To the extent that a proposal was put forth, at least we had
something to talk about.
In this instance, the first question, "Is there a problem?," is if we are
going to put in some language in the rest of the Rules to talk about
electronic discovery, do we need to define what the subject matter is
at the starting gate?
If you take a look at some of the other states and federal district
courts that have put in rules, none of them did so.' None of them
defined electronic discovery. I think that looking through it, my
thought after looking at what some of the other jurisdictions have
done, and the general premise that definitions are not favored in the
Federal Rules, I did not think that a definition was necessarily
appropriate.
I think that if you talk to folks in the places where it has been put in
place, when you talk about electronic discovery, most folks do not
need to run to a dictionary to find out what it means.
I thought that to the extent, though, that we use a definition, I
thought about the one that had been proposed, and I thought it was
2. Fed. R. Civ. P. 33.
3. See, e.g., E.D. & W.D. Ark. Appx. R. 26.1.
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an excellent start, and I molded mine working with that one. I had a
couple of comments to it, though.
One, it talks about whether the information is "created, maintained,
or stored in a certain capacity." I thought that it's okay to just simply
say that it is stuff that is in a digital format.
I thought, too, the final part, the attempt to try to identify some of
the sources from which this information could come, the definition
was "computers, telephones, PDAs, media players, media viewers,
etc." I thought maybe that might suffer from the fatality that Ken
Withers had identified, that things move so quickly that if you talk
about a PDA, in five years folks are not going to know what that is.
You know, the techies tend to change these definitions before you
have taken the equipment home.
So I tried with my definition, "electronic data is recorded
information," and I thought it should say "recorded" because there is
a danger I think that, although some of this stuff is becoming more
abstract, that the abstraction shouldn't be removed from having it
tangible. It is something that is kept somewhere, as compared to
something that is an ethereal idea in a witness's head-"that is
readable and available only through the use of electronic or other
technological means." I put the "other technological means," and I
thought that as we are moving along, maybe we do not want to limit it
to electronic means, that for example biological and chemical data,
although it sounds awfully farfetched today, I think some of the things
that we talk about today sounded farfetched ten years ago.
So that was the proposal that I thought of.
JUDGE SCHEINDLIN: Since this really is our three- to five-
minute segment, does anybody want to say anything more about that,
or should we get right into Rule 34 and documents? Anybody want to
comment on this one?
MR. COHEN: Just a couple of quick comments.
One, there is a problem with including documents that were created
electronically as electronic information because that can be converted
into paper and then it is not what we are thinking of as electronic
information.
Also, I just want to point out there is a very interesting issue in
terms of what is tangible when applied to data. Some of you may be
familiar with all sorts of different cases, cases applying the "trespass to
chattels" theory to documents, to electronic information; and cases
dealing with whether insurance policies cover electronic information.
So that is something we may all have different theories about in terms
of use of the word "tangible" with respect to electronic information.
I think what is clear is that we are not talking about paper, we are
not talking about oral testimony, and we are not talking about things
like the cow in the "replevin for a cow" case that we all read on the
first day of law school.
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JUDGE SCHEINDLIN: Okay. I think we should probably turn to
the big topic that we have for our panel, which is Rule 34.4
The question that we are really going to begin with, in the order
that I mentioned earlier, is: Do we need to revise Rule 34 at all to
define "data" or "information" and turn away from the concept of
"document," which may be creating misunderstandings and causing
problems? We are going to address that in the order we said. Adam,
do you want to give us a start?
MR. COHEN: Okay. I am just going to try to set up some of the
issues here and give a little bit of context.
The current Rule talks about "data compilations,"5 which to us
today probably sounds like a little bit of an odd formulation. It is not
a phrase that we tend to use, although in 1970 it probably sounded
almost like science fiction.
If you look at the notes6 where that phrase was imported into the
Rule, it is actually quite prescient, I think, in terms of recognizing
changing technology, the requirement of using devices, which is
similar to what we were just talking about in terms of electronic
information, needing to use some kind of technology to look at it.
The last sentence is kind of funny in the conclusion there. 7 It's sort
of what Ken was talking about, taking all the e-mails and printing
them out. I think the way we look at this has changed.
4. Rule 34(a) reads:
(a) Scope. Any party may serve on any other party a request (1) to produce
and permit the party making the request, or someone acting on the
requestor's behalf, to inspect and copy, any designated documents (including
writings, drawings, graphs, charts, photographs, phonorecords, and other
data compilations from which information can be obtained, translated, if
necessary, by the respondent through detection devices into reasonably
usable form), or to inspect and copy, test, or sample any tangible things
which constitute or contain matters within the scope of Rule 26(b) and
which are in the possession, custody or control of the party upon whom the
request is served; or (2) to permit entry upon designated land or other
property in the possession or control of the party upon whom the request is
served for the purpose of inspection and measuring, surveying,
photographing, testing, or sampling the property or any designated object or
operation thereon, within the scope of Rule 26(b).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a)
5. Id.
6. Fed. R. Civ. P. 34 advisory committee's note. The Advisory Committee's note
to Rule 34 provides:
The inclusive description of "documents"... makes clear that Rule 34
applies to electronics data compilations from which information can be
obtained only with the use of detection devices, and that when the data can
as a practical matter be made usable by the discovering party only through
respondent's devices, respondent may be required to use his devices to
translate the data into usable form.
Id.
7. Id. ("Similarly, if the discovering party needs to check the electronic source
itself, the court may protect respondent with respect to preservation of his records,
confidentiality of nondiscoverable matters, and costs.").
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There is also a recognition of the potential need to check the source
itself, so even in 1970 recognizing that there may be information that
you do not see when you print this stuff out.
I just want to point out that some local rules and state rules address
whether electronic information is included within the scope of what is
normally considered a "document" and whether it presumptively is or
it is not. You have these rules in Texas8 and Mississippi9 where you
have to specifically request electronic information and it will not be
presumptively considered a document.
In Virginia, you have this rule dealing with subpoenas. It requires
you to produce what they call a "tangible copy of [electronic]
information.""°
The central problem that I see, which was pointed out by the prior
panel, is this issue of: Do we talk about "medium" or do we talk
about "information" whatever the medium? There was a suggestion
in the materials of a limited change, adding "data" or "data
compilations in any media."
Then there is also a talking point to address the issue of metadata
and embedded data, as to whether those are included in the definition
of a "document."
JUDGE SCHEINDLIN: Okay. Dave?
MR. BUCHANAN: I guess when asked to consider the proposed
amendment, the first thing that occurred to me is: What do I think we
would all agree is information that should be disclosable in litigation?
The last panel I think was pretty instructive in guiding us about the
types of information that parties are wrestling with in terms of
discovery disputes, and then, once we understand what we think
should be disclosable in litigation, then make the definition fit the
types of categories to make sure that we are at least broad enough.
The things that came out in the last panel were databases, relational
databases, e-mail, spreadsheets, PowerPoints, embedded data,
metadata, and backup tapes. These are all things that we are talking
about as being sources of electronic data that may be disclosable.
Now, I am certainly not advocating a laundry list in a rule-I think
that would be problematic-but the definition I think has to
encompass those. The definition should not strike a balance between
the relative burdens among the parties in terms of identifying or
producing certain information. I think that is an important issue.
That is an issue that needs to be addressed, though, elsewhere in the
Rules, perhaps in Rule 26, or by the court in applying Rule 26.
8. Tex. R. Civ. P. 193.3, 196.4.
9. Miss. R. Civ. P. 26 (amended by Miss. Sup. Ct. Order 13, No. 89-R-99001-SCT,
May 29, 2003).
10. Va. Sup. Ct. R. 3A:12(b).
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The definition of "documents" has not caused problems for me in
getting all the electronic data that I have needed. It has included
relational databases, e-mails, metadata, and embedded data in very
large litigation. So I think the Rule has been extended in such a way
so that the definition encompasses those items.
That having been said, there are two items, embedded data and
metadata, that present the thorniest issues under the current Rule. I
would submit-and we'll talk about it in a little bit-that those should
be items that are presumptively documents but perhaps not something
that you get in every case.
But in thinking about what a "document" is, it certainly includes
everything within the file. It includes the creation date, the edit dates,
who did it, all that information that's all within the native file. It
includes the embedded information within the file. I think it is the
wrong place to strike the balance in Rule 34. If there are any issues of
burden, that should be addressed elsewhere.
I could certainly address a proposal for the Rule, if you want to do
that now.
JUDGE SCHEINDLIN: If you're staying in this part of it, sure.
MR. BUCHANAN: There has been a suggestion, and I think
Adam highlighted it, that we should be talking about "information" or
"data" that is "fixed in a medium." I think that eliminates the
ethereal concept that we spoke about a moment ago, information that
just crosses the wires, doesn't really register in any system, but yet it
preserves the real object of a "document." There is something
tangible, there is something physical. It is "information" or "data"
that has been "fixed in a medium." Even if it changes over time, it has
been fixed.
JUDGE SCHEINDLIN: All right. Paul?
MR. ROBERTSON: I guess I am in general agreement with David
on this, that from the defense perspective we do not see that much of
a struggle over whether a particular electronic piece of information is
considered a "document." The struggle is always whether it is relevant
to a particular case.
There are two issues that I think have been identified- and I look
back. The first time I saw them identified is in the article that Judge
Scheindlin and Jeff Rabkin did four years ago, which was extremely
prescient in nailing some of these issues."
One is, Is there a need to untie this to documents? A lot of this
stuff doesn't really fit our old definition of "document." Things like
cookies and other embedded information, does that really fit into the
definition of "document"; shouldn't it be called "information"?
11. Honorable Shira A. Scheindlin & Jeffrey Rabkin, Electronic Discovery in
Federal Civil Litigation: Is Rule 34 Up to the Task?, 41 B.C. L. Rev. 327 (2000).
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The second excellent point was, look, these are data compilations.
A compilation, if you look at the definition, is a heaping together, a
collection of information from other places. Much of this data is not a
collection or a heaping together; it is created in the first instance. I
think of a cookie again as an example.
But I think that, again, although those are issues that have been
identified, neither the practitioners nor the bench struggle with them.
If you take a look at the Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. Hasbro, Inc. case
from several years ago, it really sets forth the law here, and I quote it:
"[I]t is black letter law that computerized data is discoverable if
relevant."'" I think that has really become the issue.
So I do not see the need for a fix, even though there is a little bit of
a discrepancy between what is being done in practice and what is
actually written in the Rules. Given that everybody accepts that the
definition described in the Rules today includes not only compilations
of data but also data itself, there is not really a need for a fix.
To the extent of getting to the point if there were language to be
included in the Rules, I think that adding the word "data" before the
word "data compilations," so you simply say "data and data
compilations," would serve that fix. I do not think that it would do
any harm.
I do not think that you will find that it is a big-ticket item for either
the defense bar or the plaintiffs' bar or the judiciary, but it would
perhaps make the Rules consistent with what everybody's
understanding is and it would clean up that confusion.
JUDGE SCHEINDLIN: All right. Judge?
JUDGE FRANCIS: I think as a judge one of my primary concerns
is conflict avoidance. One way to avoid conflicts is to have clarity in
the Rules, and particularly in the definitions.
I think that while there has not been a massive problem with the
definition of "documents," for the reasons that my colleagues have
described, I think it may well be advisable to bring the definition into
conformity with actual practice, particularly because the definition of
"document" basically creates a default position. In the absence of
judicial gloss on this, people look to the Rules. "Document" I think
suggests paper, and I think it may be helpful to expand that.
I think it has implications for other parts of the Rules. For example,
when a party is going to respond to a document request, are they
going to search for everything but then respond in paper because the
Rule currently talks about "documents"? 3 So I think [an expansion
of the definition of "documents" in the Rules is needed] in order to
provide some clarity and to bring things in line with real practices.
12. Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. Hasbro, Inc., No. CIV.A.94-2120, 1995 WL 649934, at
*2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3,1995).
13. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a).
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And also I think to anticipate the future. We may agree that
everybody understands now that computerized information is a
"document," but when we go on beyond computers and we talk about
biological information and so forth, is that going to be encompassed
within the information that would be discoverable under Rule 34? I
think we should adapt to that as well.
JUDGE SCHEINDLIN: Before we turn to our next topic, which is
metadata, let me just ask you all one question. There is information
or data that is stored and never reduced to a document, such as
transient information, like spreadsheets, and they change every time
the parameters are changed, or a daily example might be an e-ticket
that is never a document unless it becomes printed. So there is
information in data that is simply stored on a medium but is not yet a
document. Does that question make you think that that needs to be
addressed in this definitional Rule 34?
MR. BUCHANAN: The important point I think with an e-ticket,
for example, is there is a database behind that e-ticket that contains all
the parameters. There is something electronic in nature that has been
fixed in a form that contains all the parameters of that e-ticket.
The same with the spreadsheet that you highlighted. While it may
change day-to-day and you have multiple versions of the document,
the formula, for example, within the document is the same perhaps, or
maybe that changes over time, too, the resulting numbers.
JUDGE SCHEINDLIN: But as the last panel said, if you printed it
out, you would never see that formula. So the question is, Can you
obtain that data when you think of the term "four-cornered
document?" That is the question I am asking.
MR. BUCHANAN: I agree. I think that is more of a production
issue in my mind, the format in which it is delivered to the other side.
JUDGE SCHEINDLIN: Okay. Anybody else want to address
that?
MR. COHEN: I just want to say that it seems that with the types of
electronic information that we have these days and that are becoming
more and more prevalent, such as transient data, instant messaging,
and digitized voicemail, we are moving closer and closer to what is
more like oral communication in how evanescent it is.
We might ask ourselves: If we are going to require data like this to
be captured and produced, does this mean now that when we have
oral conversations about a case when we are under a duty to preserve
we should be recording it all?
JUDGE SCHEINDLIN: Let's turn to an issue that at least in the
Advisory Committee we spent a lot of time thinking about, and that is
the question very specifically now of the production of metadata and
embedded data. I shouldn't have thrown in the word "production."
Put that aside for a minute. Just whether Rule 34 conceptually would
call for the production of metadata and then later embedded data. I
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would like to take those separately because they are different
concepts.
Let's talk for a minute about metadata, starting with Adam.
MR. COHEN: Okay. Just to set up the issue, Do you make this a
routine requirement of production; do you make it a permissive
requirement?
What are the positions on either side? You know, on the one hand,
opposition to routine requirement would be based on the notion that
there is not really a likelihood that it is going to be terribly material.
It is going to add costs. On the other hand, there are situations where
you are going to be adding more costs by stripping that data out -and
believe me that happens a lot in real life, oddly enough.
On the other hand, you might need the metadata to facilitate the
searching, the manipulation, the kinds of litigation databases that
people use right now to handle large amounts of documents. Some of
the formats that people produce their documents in, these image
formats without the metadata, require a lot of work before they are
actually usable in one of these databases.
So the question becomes, Should this be presumptively something
that gets produced or is it only available by special permission? We
have some positions on that that have been taken by members of the
bar and the judiciary.
The Sedona Conference 4 document shows a position where this
type of information is presumptively not something that is included in
a production unless there is separate analysis on a case-by-case basis.
The ABA talks about "duty to preserve" in a very broad way,
specifying it as "media" rather than the type of information.15
That brings us to form of production, so why don't I let the panelists
talk about metadata?
JUDGE SCHEINDLIN: We are going to hold off on form for a
little while. Let's just talk about the concept of metadata as
something that ought to be produced with the information, or not.
Dave?
MR. BUCHANAN: Again, I think, focusing within Rule 34, the
14. The Sedona Conference is accurately described as "a research and educational
institute dedicated to the study of law and policy... [which] ... has developed best
practices recommendations ... for addressing electronic document production."
Albert Barsocchini, EDD Services' Growth Rate is Staggering, The Legal
Intelligencer, Oct. 1, 2003, at 5, 5. The Sedona Principles, the prior working draft, and
related documents can all be accessed online at
http://www.thesedonaconference.org/publications-html (last visited July 19, 2004).
15. Litig. Section, Am. Bar Ass'n, Civil Discovery Standards § VIII (a), at 49
(Aug. 1999), available at
http://www.abanet.org/litigation/civiltrialstandards/home.html ("A party's duty to
take reasonable steps to preserve potentially relevant documents ... also applies
to... electronic medium or format ... word-processing document[s] [and] ...
electronic mail.").
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conclusion I reach is that this is supposed to talk about the types of
forms of documents you can request or the types of forms of
information that can be requested in litigation.
I think metadata unquestionably can be relevant to a claim. We
have seen-well, how about in paper productions of years past a file
routing slip on the top of a document that showed when a document
went to somebody, when it moved to the next person, or a revision
history that tracked changes to a contract over time? These types of
things were discoverable. They were affixed to a document or to a
file.
Now we have electronic documents that have different flavors of
similar concepts. Rule 34 needs to contemplate that those types of
documents are documents or information discoverable in litigation.
If there needs to be a balance struck, it should be struck elsewhere.
One thing that I think is important to note is there are other
proposed changes in Rules 26 and 16 that require the parties to talk.1 6
What I heard from the last panel, and I think it is an important issue,
is that the parties need to talk. I would expect that metadata and
embedded data would be something that would be discussed during
those early planning conferences both privately and with the court.
So I think Rule 34 is not the place to limit this. Rule 34 should be
encompassing, though, of metadata and embedded data. The
question is: Is rule reform necessary to accomplish that?
This is the only area in my practice I think where there is any
debate with defendants about whether metadata or embedded data is
a "document." So I do believe that clarification would be helpful in
that regard, but it should not be on a showing of good cause within
Rule 34.
JUDGE SCHEINDLIN: So in other words, you don't think it's
second tier; you think it is presumptively part of the data?
MR. BUCHANAN: It is. It's within the file wrapper.
JUDGE SCHEINDLIN: Okay, it's within the file wrapper. A little
patent law. Okay. Paul?
MR. ROBERTSON: I think that the first thing to do-you know,
the issue of whether there is a problem, I think there is a need to
unpack embedded data and metadata for a second because they really
are different things.
Folks talk about metadata and they quickly say it's information that
is embedded in the document. If you look at some of the articles and
some of the writings on this, the excellent article by Judge Scheindlin
and Jeff Rabkin talked about embedded data as being metadata;17
16. At its April 15-16, 2004 meeting the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules
approved proposed amendments to Civil Rules 16 and 26, among others. See
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/ (last visited Jul. 19, 2004).
17. See Scheindlin & Rabkin, supra note 11, at 338.
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they used the terms interchangeably, as a lot of folks do. Sedona talks
about metadata being embedded data.18
But they really are different things. I think that metadata is the
information about the information in the document-things like, in an
e-mail, the code that tells how the e-mail is to be delivered, how it is to
be routed; the information in a Word document, paragraph shifts; and
information in a spreadsheet about how calculations are to be made.
I think, on the other hand, when we talk about embedded data, it is
a very different animal. It is typically user-created edits or
information that is put into the document purposefully-things like
track changes; things like a sticky note that you put underneath; things
like other versions of the document that are hidden beneath it. I think
that those are very different things.
I think that when you are talking about embedded data, the way
that I understand it more easily is to think about embedded edits. I
think that edits to a document certainly are in certain circumstances
presumptively discoverable as a type of draft of the document.
I think, on the other hand, in 99.9% of the cases metadata is
irrelevant because it is not even the envelope that you are sending the
e-mail in-and most of this stuff, by the way, is about e-mail-it is not
the envelope information, who the e-mail is from, to whom it is being
delivered, but instead, it is instructions that you have given to the
mailman about how to take it, how it is to be routed, and then
information about how that e-mail was actually delivered.
In most instances you don't keep the FedEx package, you don't
keep the instructions telling the FedEx man or woman to go to this
certain place. It is not typically relevant. It is the equivalent of having
to go back and say, after doing a document production, "I want to
fingerprint your data room to find out who was in there and who was
not."
That said, I would certainly agree that in some cases it is very
relevant. Martha Stewart is an example of a case where you wanted
to find out about who edited this document and when.
But the question I have next is: Is there a dispute about whether
that is considered a "document"? I think that again the Rules do a
very handy job of this. I don't see any cases out there where a court
has said, "You can't have it because it's not a document." The issue
becomes, "You can't have it because it is not relevant."
Even in those cases where you do need metadata-information
about information-it is usually targeted to very few spreadsheets, a
few e-mails, and in most cases a requesting party does not want to get
with each document sometimes 800 pieces of information about that
e-mail that neither do they need nor they understand.
18. See, e.g., Abigail E. Crouse & Stephen J. Snyder, Applying Rule I in the
Information Age, 4 Sedona Conf. J. 165 (2003).
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So I don't think that there is a problem with respect to metadata. I
think that most folks understand that it is a "document," but the
question is whether it is relevant.
JUDGE SCHEINDLIN: And the judge?
JUDGE FRANCIS: I love seeing so much agreement between
plaintiffs and defendants.
I think there is agreement that metadata and embedded data are
information and that they are at least potentially relevant and
therefore come within, or should come within, the definition of
"document"19  or "discoverable information,"20  however we
characterize it.
I think the tougher issue is whether there should be some good
cause requirement imposed before a requesting party has access to
that information. There I would point out that as a judge one of the
values that I try to embody is doing justice, and that means being able
to adapt the law to the facts in a particular case. The more
constraining the Rules are, the more difficult it is for me to do that
adaptation.
If there is a good cause requirement, it is a thumb on the scales of
justice, and somebody is going to have to overcome that presumption
in order to get what may ultimately be relevant discoverable
information.
I think it is preferable to leave that to be determined on a case-by-
case basis. I think the ABA's approach to putting the burden on the
requesting party to ask for that kind of information21 is fine, but to
place a burden of persuasion on that party I think would probably be
a mistake.
JUDGE SCHEINDLIN: I think we are going to talk more about
metadata and embedded data when we move to form of production,
so don't worry that we have left it behind. We are going to get a
second round of hearing about it.
We are now going to turn to the form of production question. The
question there is whether Rule 34 should be amended to require,
either permissively or mandatorily, that the requesting party state the
form in which the e-data is to be produced. If so, should that request
be as simple as "I want paper" or "I want an electronic mode of
production"? Or should it be more complicated, such as, "I will be
satisfied with a mere .tiff image," or "I want a .pdf-searchable," or "I
want native digital information produced in a specific format, like a
19. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a).
20. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A).
21. See Electronic Discovery Task Force, Litig. Section, Am. Bar Ass'n,
Memorandum to Members of the Bench, Bar and Academia (Nov. 17, 2003), at http://
www.abanet.org/litigation/taskforces/electronic/document.pdf.
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DVD, and it has to be compatible with my Windows operating
system"?
So the question is what level of specificity should the requesting
party have to express if they should have to make a choice at all?
Then, of course, the flip side of that question is if they don't specify,
is there a default mode of production?
The third question, I suppose, is what is the producing party's
ground of objection there? Can the producing party say, "I shouldn't
have to produce it all because it is inaccessible"?
So it is that series of questions that we are about to address. And I
think, inevitably, in addressing those we are going to get back to the
metadata and embedded data because how you produce it may mean
whether or not you include those types of information.
So with that quick background-maybe I did too much-Adam?
MR. COHEN: Okay. I think that is right. There is the segue right
there-and we should probably talk to some of the technology people
about this-but the parties' determination of whether they are going
to resist production of metadata or embedded data may depend
largely on what format they have their documents in and they are
ready to produce them in. If they have gone and printed out all the e-
mails and scanned them in and created electronic images that are
stripped from the metadata, then they are not going to want to
produce the metadata.
Why require or permit a specification of the form? Well, if you ask
for documents in a certain form, this should preclude you later on
from coming in and saying, "No, no, I want something different." On
the other hand, making it optional may make sense because at an
early stage in the case when you are formulating your request you
may not know what format you need or what the other side uses or
what is going to make the most sense in general. In any case, there is
always going to be a need to balance the burden of producing in a
certain form against the utility to the other party.
Another issue that has come up-I don't know how common this
issue is-is that there are certain proprietary aspects to certain
formats. For example, parties have data that can only be viewed with
certain proprietary software and generally will resist producing that
type of software. At any rate, it seems like it would make sense to
discuss it in the initial conference.
If you look at the Sedona Conference, the position that they
represent, they talk about the importance being the substantive
information content, that you should not have to produce documents
in more than one format. They suggest that "production of electronic
data in a commonly accepted image format should be sufficient.
22
22. Jonathan M. Redgrave, The Sedona Principles: Best Practices
Recommendations & Principles for Addressing Electronic Document Production, 4
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Now, that has implications of course for metadata and embedded
data. "Data that is not ordinarily viewable or printed when
performing a normal print command need not be produced.
2 3
At the same time, there is a recognition that electronic formats may
be preferable in many cases; whatever format is chosen should deal
with the genuineness/authenticity issues; and that there should never
be a requirement to produce in both hard copy and electronic form. I
know this is something that is often the subject of debate based on the
case law that is out there already.
The ABA has said that you should consider asking for production
in electronic form-you should consider asking for production in a
form that gives you the ancillary information. 4
And then there are some of the cases that were talked about that
deal with these issues in different contexts.
Here the Bristol-Myers case 25 shows what happens when a party
goes ahead and scans all these paper documents into images and then
they want to produce them back in paper as per the ancient past. This
was a case where I guess no one had said anything about the fact that
these documents were available electronically, and were trying to get
somebody to pay the cost of a normal paper production when that
wasn't really necessary. In that case, they were required to produce in
electronic format.26
Interestingly, and probably most controversially, there was no
requirement that the other side, the requesting party, pay for any of
those costs that were involved in creating the electronic format.
The issue of the proprietary format came up in the Honeywell
case,27 where PricewaterhouseCoopers stated that production of these
documents in a usable form would require the use of proprietary
software or large cost. The court basically gave them the option of
either producing the proprietary software, the proprietary format,
using the protective order, or paying for it themselves.28
And then finally-and this shows another aspect of this issue-the
McNally case,29 which shows no presumption that you get the
computer files when you've got the paper production because you
need to show some sort of special basis for it.
Sedona Conf. J. 197, 229 (2003).
23. Id.
24. See Electronic Discovery Task Force, supra note 21.
25. In re Bristol-Myers Squibb Sec. Litig., 205 F.R.D. 437 (D.N.J. 2002).
26. Id. at 442-43.
27. In re Honeywell Int'l, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. M8-85, 2003 WL 22722961, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 2003).
28. Id. at *2.
29. McNally Tunneling Corp. v. City of Evanston, No. 00-C-6979, 2001 WL
1568879, at *1 (N.D. I11. Dec. 10, 2001).
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MR. BUCHANAN: I suspect this will be more of a point of
departure between the plaintiffs and the defendants, and that is the
form of production.
There is no question that plaintiffs prefer as a general matter native
production of electronic files. That provides all the embedded data,
the metadata to the extent it has been appropriately preserved. It
gives you the opportunity to quickly search for terms. In short, it puts
you on the same playing field as the defendants, or the company at
least, in accessing their own data. Those are the arguments plaintiffs
use to get native production.
But you may not want a native production in all cases, and that is
why it is important I think for there not to be a presumptive
production format of native, because we talk about proprietary
formats. Or even if we're talking about relational databases, if I have
to receive all of your databases in a native format, I may not have the
capability of rebuilding that, as opposed to me meeting with you and
discussing the appropriate searches to run on the data, extracting the
data, running it in reports, and producing the electronic versions of
the reports that I can then load into my database.
So I think again this is something that is in Rule 34, but I think it is
something that will be addressed quite specifically by the parties at
their 26(f) conference and at the Rule 16 status conference as to how
to treat non-paper documents: How are we going to treat electronic
data? How are we going to produce it? How are we going to preserve
it? What are we going to do with the embedded data? And what are
we going to do with the metadata?
The Rule needs to contemplate the production of native data. That
is the most easily usable form for litigants as a general matter. That
statement can be thrown completely out the window, though, when it
comes to large proprietary systems where a smaller plaintiff, or even a
large plaintiff, doesn't have access to the software to view it.
JUDGE SCHEINDLIN: Let me just ask you a few quick
questions. So do you favor a rule that mandates the requesting party
should select the form of production it wants? You are usually a
requesting party. Should you have to state what you want?
MR. BUCHANAN: I will, and I do, and I will do that in the Rule
26 conference and I will do it in the Rule 16 conference. I think
making it permissive to do so and making it permissive for the other
side to object to the form requested is fine. But I think having a
presumptive form of production would tilt the scales in favor of
something that may not work across a large-scale litigation.
JUDGE SCHEINDLIN: That was only my first question. Should
you have to specify to avoid confusion?
MR. BUCHANAN: I think it should be permissive.
JUDGE SCHEINDLIN: Permissive, okay.
The other question I have for you is should the Rule talk about "the
20041
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data should be produced in the form in which it is created, in which it
is ordinarily created"? Should that be the fallback, presumptive
form?
MR. BUCHANAN: Here's what I want. I will let people who are
good with language and the Drafting Committee tell me the best way
to implement it. What I want is information that is as accessible or as
usable as on the defendant's system. I mean that is what I want. In
many cases that is native files. In other cases with complex databases,
it may be an extract of the data from the databases.
JUDGE SCHEINDLIN: Okay, Paul?
MR. ROBERTSON: I hate to disappoint once again, and I think it
is a function of how reasonably David approaches most of these
issues, but I don't substantially depart from what he is saying.
I think that, again, the first question is, "Is there a problem?" As he
said, "Look, in some cases I want the data in its native format," and I
think that is absolutely right. In some cases, there are issues where
the data in its native format is relevant. I think that in other cases you
don't want that.
The Sedona Principles took the approach that, in most cases,
production in paper or .tiff images is acceptable.30 That draws gasps
from a lot of plaintiffs, and rightfully so in these mega-document
cases. But I think that sometimes we forget, with all of these numbers
of terabytes and petabytes, that in most cases the typical sides are not
looking at that kind of volume of documents, they're looking at a
smaller volume of documents.
So when you create a default position that says things like, "you
have to express how you want electronic documents to be delivered to
you," often it is only 1000 pages or 2000 pages, and so getting
electronic documents isn't necessarily useful.
Is there a presumption that a party should have to produce things in
its native format? I think that the answer is there should not be such a
presumption because it is a very fact-driven issue.
JUDGE SCHEINDLIN: Should the requester have to ask up-front
and specify [the format]?
MR. ROBERTSON: I think that the answer is this. A caveat,
though, is of course if you specify electronic documents-that doesn't
get you to where you want to go, by the way, because you will
sometimes get a .tiff image, and that still is the equivalent of getting a
hard-copy document. So I think that, as Dave was saying, you want
something that is both electronic but then searchable in the same way
that the defendant had it.
I think that there are three ways to go about this: education is one;
two is putting something in the Rule 26(f) conference; and three is
30. See Redgrave, supra note 22, at 223.
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putting it in Rule 34. I think that the first two answers are the way to
go. I think that this is something where education is needed, where
places like the Manual for Complex Litigation, Fourth31 has some
language to encourage parties to talk about this. I think it is
important to put it in the Rule 26 checklist,32 to make both parties talk
about these kind of things, or suggest that they do, so that they can
avoid these situations in cases where they are relevant.
I don't think it is appropriate to put it in Rule 34 for a couple of
reasons. One is that there are good reasons that defendants do not
produce things in their native format, and it is not simply to hide
things. It is because, for example, you can't Bates stamp things, they
are manipulatable by the discovering party, and they can be changed
so you show up in court and something that you produced in one
format looks much different than it otherwise did.
I think the other problem is that if you set up in Rule 34 the
suggestion that one party "must" or "may" specify and the other party
has the right to object, you create a sort of presumption that there is
this right to get things in a native format. And I don't think that
anybody is going there. I think people are saying it is a
communication problem, which I think is best handled with 26(f).
JUDGE SCHEINDLIN: How does that play into our discussion of
metadata and embedded data, though? I mean, if you are doing a .tiff
image, you are presumptively not getting it. If you are doing paper,
you are presumptively not getting it. I think Dave said he thinks he
presumptively should get it.
MR. ROBERTSON: I think that-and I'd be willing and eager to
hear David's comments on this, of course-in many cases the
metadata is not relevant. When you say metadata, I think that you
want to have it searchable.
You want to get an e-mail that even if it is produced in .tiff, you
have a concomitant list of searchable data that allows you to organize
it by sender, by recipient, by date. That is important. But when I
think of metadata, I think about pages and pages of code about how
the e-mail got from Tallahassee to Gainesville via some server out in
the western part of the country. I don't think anybody wants that and
it's very rare that it is needed.
JUDGE SCHEINDLIN: Given our time constraints, we are going
to the judge.
JUDGE FRANCIS: This is a series of issues where I think I am
firmly ambivalent. I think that I disagree with Dave and believe that
it probably would be helpful in avoiding conflict to require the
requesting party to identify the form of production. Now, I do not
think that that needs to be done in the Rule very specifically, but the
31. Manual for Complex Litigation (Fourth) (2004).
32. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(f).
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Advisory Committee notes might point out that the greater the
specificity, the more likely we will be to avoid future problems.
If there is such a requirement, should there be a default mode
identified? I think that is important. If there is no default mode, then
judges are left with the question: "Well, he didn't identify the form of
production; that means I should impose a default mode, or it means
the request should be stricken?" I don't think that provides enough
guidance, so I think there needs to be a default mode.
Which brings us to the $64,000 question, which is what is that
default mode? There I am truly at sea. If I were to write a rule for
today, I think I would say paper production, because that is what
everybody is capable of doing, everybody who receives it is capable of
analyzing it. It is cumbersome, it is burdensome, but everybody can
deal with it.
But as I hear our technological people tell us that paper is going to
disappear, I think such a rule would be quickly archaic. So I am
looking for something that would be a reasonable default position.
But I think that there needs to be a default position.
And finally, in terms of whether there should be an identification of
the responding party's right to object because it is inaccessible or hard
to produce, I think that is in the Rules. I don't think there is a
necessity for electronic or other kinds of information to specify the
opportunity to object.
Rule 26(b)(2)33 sets out terrific guidelines for weighing factors to
determine whether a document production is too burdensome, too
costly, and so forth, and those Rules encompass the question of
accessibility. I don't think there is anything necessary to be done
there.
JUDGE SCHEINDLIN: Given our time constraints, our last topic,
responding to interrogatories, will receive the shortest treatment.
MR. COHEN: And we have some suggestion as to what we could
do to sort of tweak the current Rule to deal with electronic
information. That would include producing the electronic information
and, I suppose, identifying it as well, and possibly giving computer
software so that you could derive the answer to your interrogatory
from that electronic information.
Questions that have been raised are:
9 Whether we need to include this option of giving the "computer
software," or whether we stay with, I guess, the more general
solution of giving sufficient information to find what you are looking
for.
o And a question as to whether parties are employing Rule 33(d)
with regard to hard-copy and computerized files. In my experience,
33. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2).
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they are. This is one of those situations where you might invite
somebody over to come run queries on your database.
* And how does the fact that in many cases data produced is
prepared for the purpose of responding to an interrogatory-how
does that mesh with the obligation imposed under Rule 34?
JUDGE SCHEINDLIN: I think the real question here is: if a
producing party takes the option of producing in this way, you would
think the requesting party wants to be able to use it; so if you are
going to produce it, do you have to produce enough to make it usable,
which may mean the software or other material that goes with it?
Do you want to say just one [final] thing?
MR. BUCHANAN: The premise of this provision is that it is as
easy for the receiving party to access the data as it is for the defendant
or for the producing party. If you don't have the software tools to
access the data, you don't have the same ease to access the data that
the defendant does. So I think any production of electronic data
pursuant to an interrogatory request has to be accompanied by the
tools to access the data.
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